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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In the field of constitutional law, the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia have been, for the most part, during
the year 1955, definitive in nature. Some of the decisions are of
especial interest based either on their fact situation or on their
judicial history. Others are discussed with the viewpoint of
showing the position of the Supreme Court of Appeals with respect to the problem with which they are confronted in relation
to that held by other jurisdictions and the United States as a
whole. Overall, the Virginia decisions reflect a continuity of
judicial opinion.
I.
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
State Aid to Private Schools. A recent Virginia decision,
Almond v. Day,' which involved the payment of tuition, institutional fees, and other designated expenses to children of Virginia
citizens who died or were disabled in military service,2 has added
further definition to the separation of church and state.
The Attorney General of Virginia sought to mandamus the
issuance of warrants for such payments from the State Comptroller, who had refused to issue vouchers on the basis that issuance
would contravene the provisions of Section 141 of the Virginia
Constitution as applied to private schools, and would be violative
-of the provisions of the Virginia and Federal Constitutions granting religious freedom and separation of church and state. The
Court, using the test of direct and indirect benefit, held the provisions of Item 210 were separable and that these provisions were
void and unconstitutional to the extent that they purported to
authorize payments for tuition, institutional fees and other designated expenses of eligible children who attended approved or
designated private schools. Such payments were held to be of
direct benefit to the schools (religions) and of only indirect
benefit to the children concerned.
1 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E,2d 851 (1955).
2

Item 210, Appropriation Act of 1954.

The Almond case clarifies at least to some extent, the question
of state aid to religions. The nine-year-old Supreme Court case
of Everson v. Board of Education established the very clear
standard that the Constitution creates a high wall between church
and state and that state aid even to all religions is forbidden. And
in Cantwell v. State of Connecticut4 it was said, "it is settled that
the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment has rendered the
legislature of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such
laws."
The Everson case by a five-to-four decision held that public
reimbursement to parents for bus fares to public and parochial
schools was of direct benefit to the parents and of only indirect
benefit to the Catholic religion. Ignoring this test, the United
5
States Supreme Court held in McCollum v. Board of Education
that a released time program that was conducted in public school
buildings was unconstitutional. However, where the released
time program was not conducted in public school buildings, the
Court thought it sufficiently differentiated in Zorach v. ClausonO
7
so as to be constitutional. The distribution of Gideon Bibles
and the permissive reading of the Lord's Prayer 8 were held constitutionally different even though both cases required voluntary
assent on the part of the participants. The distribution of Gideon
Bibles was held to be a forbidden preference of one religion over
another and unconstitutional; while permissive reading of the
Lord's Prayer was held not to be sectarian and constitutional.
The Almond decision represents the adoption of the test
utilized in the Everson case, the defining of constitutionality in
terms of direct versus indirect benefit to religion. It is too early
to tell whether this test is a valid test; but, in light of the decisions of the McCollum and Zoracb cases and the Doremus and
Tudor cases, the conclusion could be reached that attempted
differentiations without the use of some test as a guide result in
illogical distinctions. Should the McCollum and Zoracb cases
have been differentiated on the basis of the constitutionality of the
1 (1947). See Kauper, Churcb, State and Freedom: A
(1954).
4 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1939).
5 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
6 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
7 Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953).
8 Doremus v. Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950).

8 330 U.S.

Review

use of a school building for a released time program or on the
basis of the constitutionality of the released time program itself?
It is possible that the decision of the Supreme Court might have
been different had the court used the test of direct versus indirect
benefit, for the above question would have had to be answered.
The test utilized in Almond v. Day appears to better attain the
defining of the boundary line separating church and state.
II.
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
Revocation of Driver's License. Section 46-416.2 of the
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Acte makes it mandatory on
the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles to revoke
the license of any person, resident or non-resident, upon receipt
of a record of his conviction of reckless driving and of any provision of law establishing the lawful rates of speed of motor
vehicles when the offenses upon which the conviction are based
were committed within a period of twelve consecutive months.*
As regards the right of appeal, Section 46-424 of the same Act 0
governs: "No appeal shall lie in any case in which the revocation
of the license or registration was mandatory except to determine
the identity of the person concerned when the question of identity is in dispute."

11

[Italics added]. The Supreme Court of

Appeals has upheld the determination of the Commissioner in revoking a license under the terms of these sections in the case of
2
Lamb v. Curry.1

Curry appealed the determination of the Commissioner in
the lower couyt not on the basis of identity but on the basis that
the provisions of' the Code,' 8 under which the revocation of his
license took place, became effective14 subsequent to his commission and conviction of the offenses charged. He was convicted of
reckless driving on October 28, 1953, and of the offense of operating an automobile at an unlawful rate of speed on MVay 21, 1954,
9
Va. Code (1950) as amended by Act 1954. c. 538.
10 Va. Code (1950), Acts 1952, c. 544.
11 Ibid.
12 197 Va. 395, 89 S.E.2d 329 (1955).
Is Section 46-416.2.
14 Ibid; became effective on June 30, 1954.

the offenses having been committed within a twelve month period.
The trial court held that the application of Section 46-416.2 to
the present case would constitute ex post facto legislation and
would be violative of Section 58 of the Constitution of Virginia,
since this section (46-416.2) did not become effective until June
30, 1954. The lower court also found that it was not mandatory
on the Commissioner to revoke a license for one offense of reckless driving and one offense of operation of an automobile at an
unlawful rate of speed under the provisions of Section 46-416
which was in force at the time of the convictions, and that, therefore, the right of appeal granted to Curry under Section 46-424
was not restricted to identity.
The Commissioner, under the provisions of Section 46-424,
appealed the lower court decision as an appeal of right to the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. The Commissioner argued
that Curry's right to appeal from the revocation was restricted to
identity alone under Section 46-424, and that, since this point
had not been relied upon by Curry, the decision of the lower
court was erroneous.
The Supreme Court of Appeals in rendering their decision,
which reversed that of the lower court and reinstated the decision
of the administrative board, acknowledged the fact that until
Section 46-416.2 became effective on June 30, 1954, there was
"no provision in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act
making it mandatory that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
revoke an operator's license after conviction of an offense of
reckless driving and an offense of operating a motor vehicle at an
unlawful rate of speed." 15 The Court then inexplicably reversed
themselves and by their reliance upon Dillon v. Joyner 0 held, at
least impliedly, that revocation was mandatory in the present case
and that any appeal on the part of Curry was limited under the
provisions of Section 46-424 to the question of the identity of the
person involved. Thus the Supreme Court of Appeals found no
error in the decision of the Commissioner in revoking Curry's
license.
This writer finds it difficult to reconcile the holding of the
Supreme Court of Appeals with the clearly-stated and unambigu'a Lamb v. Curry, 197 Va. 395, 397 (1955).
16 192 Va. 559, 66 S.E.2d 583 (1951).

ous provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act
on the following points:
1. Section 46-416 was in effect at the time of the commission
and conviction of the offenses committed by Curry, but had no
provision for mandatory revocation of an operator's license for
such offenses;
2. Dillon v. Joyner is distinguishable from the present case in
that mandatory revocation of an operator's license is provided for
by Section 46-416 for conviction of two offenses of reckless
driving within a twelve month period and was in effect at the
time Dillon committed and was convicted of the offenses;
3. Section 46-424 allovs an appeal of the Commissioner's
action restricted to identity alone where revocation is mandatory;
4. Section t6-424 allows an appeal of the Commissioner's
action where the revocation is not mandatory and does not restrict such appeal to identity alone;
5. Section 46-420 allows revocation of an operator's license
by the Commissioner, where such revocation is discretionary and
not mandatory, only after due hearing, upon the giving of not
less than five days written notice by registered letter to the address given by the operator when applying for his license; and, in
the instant case, no hearing was held nor notice given;
6. Section 46-416.2 was not in force at the time of the commission and conviction of the offenses of which Curry was adjudged guilty and the enforcement of its provisions would operate
retrospectively upon him. The Trial Court clearly erred in holding that its application would constitute ex post facto legislation.
Calder v. Bull1 7 defined ex post facto as being any retrospective

law imposing criminal punishment after the act, for which the
punishment is being subscribed, had been committed. And
Prichard v. Battle'8 interpreted revocation under the provisions
of Section 46-416 to be civil in nature and not criminal, and in no
sense penal in nature.1 9 The application of Section 46-416.2 in the
instant case serves to operate as a Bill of Attainder in that it is a
legislative act which without judicial trial deprives named in173

Dallas (US) 386 (1798).

18 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E2d 393 (1941).

.19 Anglin v. Joyner, 181 Va. 660,26 SE.2d 58 (1943).

dividuals, or groups easily ascertainable (i.e., persons upon whom
20
it would operate retrospectively), of any right or privilege.
If legislation of this nature is allowed to operate retrospectively,
the rights and privileges of every citizen will rest not on the rock
of constitutional justice but on the shifting sands of legislative
pleasure.

Statutes-Provision Unconstitutionally Vague. "The
statute to be valid, must, by its language, fairly construed . . .
supply the standard by which the guilt of the accused person is
to be determined. If the statute does not thus supply such
standard, it is invalid for vagueness and uncertainty . . . 121
In the case of Booth v. Commonwealth,22 a lower court en-

tered an order of interdiction based on Sections 4-51 (a)2 and
4-52(a) 24 against Booth by reason of the fact that he was an
"improper person" to be allowed to purchase alcoholic beverages.
This order was based on the vague and indefinite contentions of
the Commonwealth that there was evidence of suspicious circumstances which tended to show that Booth was selling alcoholic
beverages in violation of law and that it was possible that he had
been convicted of driving an automobile while under the influence
of alcohol. No direct evidence supported these contentions.
The Supreme Court of Appeals properly reversed and dismissed the action on appeal, sustaining the contention of Booth
as to the unconstitutionality of the interdiction order because of
the vagueness of the term "improper person." As the Court said
at page 179: "We are of the opinion that the phrase "improper
person" employed in the statute admits of such arbitrary interpretation as to make the provision unconstitutionally vague and
indefinite."

2

20 See Note 18 supra.
21
2

2

Standard Oil Co. v. Comm., 131 Va. 830, 841, 109 S.E. 316 (1921).
197 Va. 177, 88 S.E.2d 916 (1955).

8Va. Code (1950) which allows interdiction of person convicted of illegal
sale of alcoholic beverages.
24
Va. Code (1950) which allows interdiction of person convicted of driving
an automobile while intoxicated.

25

Booth v. Comm., 197 Va. 177, 179 (1955).

See also Kunz v. N.Y., 340

U.S. 290 (1950); State v. Klapport, 127 N.J.L. 395, 22 A.(2d) 877 (1941).
For other unconstitutionally vague measures which have been declared
violative of Due Process, see US. v. Cohen Grocery, 255 US. 81 (1920);
Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 343 US. 495 (1951).

Procedural Due Process-Escalator Clause in Rate Making. Although escalator clauses in gas rates do not have a long
history in Virginia, the case of City of Norfolk v. Virginia Electric and Power Company26 is by no means without Virginia
precedent. The State Corporation Commission has authorized
escalator clauses for two smaller gas utilities distributing propane
gas and also for the Washington Gas Light Company."
An escalator clause is nothing more than a fixed rule under
which future rates to be charged the public are determined. It'
is merely the addition of a mathematical formula to the fixed
schedule of the company so utilizing it under which the rates and
charges fluctuate as the wholesale cost of gas to the company
fluctuates. Thus, the resulting rates are as firmly fixed under the
escalator clause as they would be if stated in terms of money.
In approving the escalator clause, after giving a hearing to
those interested, the Commission did not fix rates retroactively.
It authorized and prescribed a mathematical formula to be inserted in the schedule of the Virginia Electric and Power Company which was to serve as a guide, direction, or rule of action
for determining future rates.
For these reasons, the Court held that the escalator clause did
not deny procedural due process of law to the consumers because no public notice and hearing were given on each occasion
the actual rate was increased. Nothing in the Code of Virginia requires such notice and hearing other than when changes take
place in the filed schedules of rates, which are the underlying
bases for the operation of the escalator clause computations. The
operation of an escalator clause, therefore, does not violate any
constitutional or statutory limitation.2 8
26 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140 (1955).
27

For other states which have approved escalator clauses, see Re. Brooklyn
Borough Gas. Co, 100 P.U.R.N.S. 271 (1953); Re Southern Calif. Gas
Co., 99 P.U.R.N.S. 272 (Calif. P.U.C. 1952).

28 See, In Re Virginia Railway and Power Company, 1921 S.C.C. 60; In Re
Lynchburg Traction and Light Company, 1921 S.C.C. 137. Electric
rates with fuel clauses were accepted by the Commission more than
thirty years ago.

REGULATION OF COMMERCE
Public Utility Valuation in Rate Making. In a recent
case2 9 concerning public utility valuation in rate making, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, following the decision as
laid down in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas
Company, 80 which abandoned the "present fair value" formula in
favor of the "original cost" or "prudent investment" standard
advocated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, 8 1 upheld the application of
the Net Cost Investment Theory in determining the rates to be
2
charged by the Virginia Electric and Power Company.3
This decision by the Court is representative of the trend in
the United States today since the Hope decision. In only one reported case,83 which is still in the process of appeal, has this new
standard been discarded in favor of a return to the old "present
fair value" formula.
Police Power Versus Interstate Commerce. A factually
interesting case was that of Lasting Products Company, a Corporation v. Paul Genovese.84 The case involved the Virginia
Paint Lawa5 which requires persons selling or transporting paint
for sale in Virginia to register annually with the Commissioner of
Agriculture, and to label their products in a specified manner,
violation being a misdemeanor. Its avowed and real purpose is
to prevent fraud and deception."0
The Court held that since there was a substantial connection
29 Bd. of Supervisors of Arlington County v. VEPCO, 196 Va. 1102, 87

S.E.2d 139 (1955).
80 320 U.S. 591 (1943).
81 Missouri ex rel Southwestern

Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com-

mission, 262 U.S. 276 (1922).

82C & P Telephone Co. v. Comm., 147 Va. 43, 136 SYF. 575 (1927); Norfolk
v. C & P Telephone Co., 192 Va. 292, 64 S.E.2d 772 (1951); Bd. of Super33

visors v. Comm, 186 Va. 963, 45 S.E.2d 145 (1947).

New York Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm., 286 App. Div. 28, 192

N.Y.S.2d 68 (3d Dep't., 1955).
197 Va. 1, 87 S.E.2d 811 (1955).
3 Va. Code (1950) Sections 59-61.1 - 59-61.12.
3o 10 M.J., Interstate Commerce, Sec. 6, p. 639; 10 Am. Jur., Commerce, 194,
84

page 86.

between its purpose and its provisions, the law is a valid exercise
of the State's police power,87 though its provisions may affect
products travelling in interstate commerce. The Court denied
recovery to the Corporation of the balance due and owing from
Genovese basing their denial on the rule that a contract made in
violation of a statute enacted to protect the public against fraud,
imposition, or to safeguard the public health or morals, is illegal
and unenforceable by the guilty party. 88
Delegation of Legislative Power. The question before the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the case of Chapel v.
Commonwealtb89 was whether the Legislature had delegated to
an administrative board the power to make rules and regulations
relating to the dry cleaning business without prescribing a stand40
ard or test to guide the board in the exercise of its discretion.
The Court discussed the conflict in the United States today
as regards the validity of statutes regulating the dry cleaning
business. Some authorities hold such regulations valid, basing the
validity on the exercise of the police powers of the state to effect
public health;4 1 other authorities hold such regulations not within
42
the scope of public health and therefore invalid.
From the evidence adduced, the Court rightfully found that
the State Dry Cleaners Board had unfettered power as regards the
promulgation of rules and regulations. Repeatedly, Virginia
courts have held the grant of such broad discretion to administrative boards and lack of standards unconstitutional." As regards
37 Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 US. 352, 33 S.Ct. 729. 57 LEd. 1511 (1912).

38

See Cohen v. Mayflower Corp, 196 Va. 1153, 86 S.E.2d 860 (1955);
Rohanna v. Vozzana, 196 Va. 549, 84 SE.2d 440 (1954); Surf Realty

Corp. v. Standing, 195 Va. 431, 78 SE.2d 901 (1953); and Brown Electric Co, Inc., v. Foley, 194 Va. 92, 72 SJE.2d 388 (1952).
39 197 Va. 406, 89 S.E.2d 337 (1955).
401936 Acts, 537, as amended and codified in 1950 Code, Title 54, Chap. 9,
41

Sections 54-201, to 54-216.

Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board, 134

Fla. 1, 183 So. 759 (1938).
v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 SJE.2d 854 (1940).
43 Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va. 481, 39 SE.2d 348 (1946); Kizee v. Conway, 184
Va. 300, 35 S.E.2d 99 (1945). And see 16 C.JS, Const.' Law, S138,
p. 373, and cases cited, where it is said, "Where such a power is

42 State

left to the unlimited discretion of a board, to be exercised without the
guide of legislative standards, the statute is not only discriminatory but
must be regarded as an attempted delegation of legislative function

offensive both to the State and Federal Constitutions."

the mandatory requirement for cities and voluntary requirements
for counties, the Court, basing their holding on the decision in
Eubank v. Richmond,44 decided that the legislature had no authority to levy a license tax on business conducted in one part
of the State and to refrain from levying the same license tax on
similar businesses in other parts of the State.
The Court distinguished the present case from those involving milk and those concerning transportation of liquor. Liquor
has recognized evil propensities; 45 milk, because of its consumption by almost all citizens, affects the public health and safety.4"
It is apparent that the Court, while not deciding the point, is
somewhat dubious of maintaining that the regulation of dry
cleaning businesses is a proper exercise of the police power of the
State in protecting the public health and safety.
In the main the Court relies on their decision in Thompson
v. Smith,4 7 where it is said: "It is a fundamental principle of our
system of government that the rights of man be determined by
the law itself and not by the let or leave of administrative officers
or bureaus.., the legislative branch of the government may not
divest itself of this function or delegate it to executive or administrative officers."
Taxation of Interstate Commerce. A number of cases
were decided during 1955 concerning interstate commerce and
state taxation. The decisions of the Court are representative of
the status of Virginia law in this field and
conform to the mas
jority view in the United States today."

In County Board v. Arcade Sunshine Company," the Supreme Court of Appeals, relying upon the recent cases of Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, Chairman State Tax Commission"
and Nippert v. Richmond,"1 as being decisive, held that the tax
44 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
45

Reynolds v. Milk Commission, 163 Va. 957, 179 S.E. 507 (1935).

46Dickerson v. Comm., 181 Va. 313, 24 S.E2d 55 (afl'd 321 US. 131 (1943).
47

155 Va. 367, 379, 154 SE. 579, 71 A.L.R. 604 (1930).

4" For

a definitive discussion of cases in this field, see Anderson, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 1 Wash. U. Law Quarterly 1 (1952).

196 Va. 916, 86 S.E.2d 162 (1955).
50 342 U.S. 389 (1951).
51 327 U.S. 416 (1945).
49

on laundry pick-up service constituted a burden on interstate
commerce; but that a tax on local laundry pick-up stations for the
privilege of doing business, on the authority of Dunston v. City
of Norfolk,52 did not constitute a burden on interstate commerce
and was therefore valid. On the same reasoning, the Court
reached a similar result in Cozmty Board v. Kent Stores"3 as regards local laundry pick-up stations.
The Court, in Chesapeakeand Potomac Telephone Company
of Virginia v. City of Norfolk,64 held that a municipal tax on
gross receipts of a telephone company "from local telephone exchange service" within the city was valid as a privilege tax58 and
was not a property tax contrary to the tax segregation statutes,
Code 1950, Sections 58-9 and 58-10. The Court also found the
municipal ordinance imposing such a tax was not violative of
the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution since the tax
imposed was restricted to receipts from intrastate business exclusively.5
With respect to the Gross Receipts Road Tax embodied in
Section 58-638 of the Virginia Code (1950), the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia held, in Express Company v. Commonwealtb,57 that the tax imposed by the Code did not contravene
the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. 8 The Express
Company was in the process of being sold to a Connecticut firm
which had taken over its operation and claimed an exemption
under granted reciprocity agreements 59 between Virginia and
Connecticut. The Court found that title to the Company still
rested in the Virginia resident seller and therefore the imposition
of the tax was valid though the business was being operated by a
foreign corporation. In the words of the Court in Hunton v.
52177 Va. 689, 15 S.E.2d 86 (1941).
58196 Va. 929,86 S.E.2d 44 (1955).
54196 Va. 627, 85 S.E.2d 345 (1955).
5 Railway Express Agency v. Comm, 347 US. 359 (1953); Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. Comm., 196 Va. 368, 83 S.E.2d 921 (1954).
56 Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. City of Norfolk, 101 Va. 125, 43 S.E. 207

(1903).
196 Va. 1007, 86 S.E.2d 818 (1955).
58 Boggett Transportation Co. v. Comm., 195 Va. 359, 78 S.E.2d 702 (1953).
For history of the reciprocity agreement see Atlantic & Danville Railway Co. v. Hooker, 199 Va. 996, 502, 74 S.E.2d 270, 275 (1953).
59
Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Bd. of Railway Com'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 68
S.Ct. 167, 92 L.Ed. 99 (1947).
5

CommonwealthO ° " ...

exceptions are strictly construed against

the party asserting such exemption."

IV.
DUE PROCESS
Segregation. Tate v. Department of Conservation and Development"1 involved the admission of Negroes to Virginia State
Parks. This suit was instituted in 1951 by the plaintiffs who
sought a permanent injunction against the defendants, their
lessees, agents and successors in office to restrain such defendants
from henceforth refusing Negroes admission to Virginia State
Parks. The case was continued and a hearing was not set until
February 25, 1954; the trial was held June 29, 1955.
Historically, Virginia has had no separate but equal facilities
as regards State Parks. Thus the United States Supreme Court
decision abandoning the "separate but equal" doctrine0 2 had no
application. Prior to the commencement of this action, there had
been no overt action on the part of the Commonwealth to lease
the park lands to private individuals; but late in 1954 bids were
received for such leases. At the time of trial, the negotiations
were still pending.
The problem presented was whether the State could deprive
or relieve itself of the constitutional obligation to afford colored
citizens equal rights with those of white citizens in the use of the
public recreational facilities constructed with publk funds by
leasing them to a private association. As was said in Lawrence v.
Hancock: "It is not conceivable that a city can provide the ways
and means for a private individual or corporation to discriminate
against its own citizens. Having set up the swimming pool by
authority of the legislature, the city, if the pool is operated, must
operate it itself, or, if leased, must see that it is operated without
any such discrimination."
60 166 Va. 229, 183 S.E. 873 (1936).
61 133 F.Supp. 53 (1955).
02Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 US. 483 (1954); And see Saveatt v.
Painter, 339 US. 629 (1950).
03 76 FSupp. 1004, 1005 (1948).

"The power to lease does not include the power to discriminate against members of a minority race in the exercise of their
constitutional rights" was said in Culver v. City of Warren,"
involving a swimming pool operated by a veterans organization
which refused membership to Negroes by utilizing a secret ballot.
The Court in granting the prayed-for injunction took notice
of the intent of the legislature in attempting to lease these lands
and the extreme likelihood of continued segregation if lands were
leased to private individuals without a check and balance by the
State in the lease regarding such segregation. The Court did not
deny the right of the State to sell or lease in "absolute good
faith," but warned that any such transaction would be minutely
examined by the Court should the problem come before it. The
contention on the part of the State that a normal lessor-lessee relationship should be permitted in leases of public property was
held by the Court to have to give way to the constitutional rights
of the citizens as a whole. "All lands, the title to which are in
the Commissioner of Park Districts, are held in trust for the equal
benefit of all the people of the State, . . . the facilities of park
districts are for the equal benefit of all the people of the State,...
park districts cannot operate their facilities or permit them to be
operated in such a manner that a preferential use thereof is granted
to any one person or to any group of persons." Or,
Police Power and Public Health. In Virginia, the creation
of Sanitary Districts is authorized by both the general law" and
by the Virginia Constitution.0 Such acts and regulations are a
legitimate exercise of the police power in the field of public health
8
and safety.
In Weber City Sanitation Commission v. R. G. Craft,"9 the
evidence adduced showed that the district had no sewage disposal
system, that the majority of wells in the area were contaminated,
that the petitioner's well had at one time been declared contam64 84 Ohio App. 373, 82 N.E.2d 82, 88 (1948).

Or, Lincoln Park Traps v. Chicago Park District, 313 l. App. 107, 55 N.E.2d
173, 176 (1944).
66 Va. Code (1950).
67 Section 147.
68 C B & Q R R Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 26 S.Ct. 341, 50 L.Ed 596 (1905).

69 196 Va. 1140, 87 S.E.2d 183 (1955).

inated, and-that, in view of the situation presented, a sanitary
commission or district was necessary in order to "prevent or reduce pollution of waters of the State in the area by the discharge
of sewage and industrial waste therein and the providing of an
adequate water supply for the inhabitants therein

preservation of the health of the people of said area..

..

. for the
7

"Even in the absence of such convincing evidence, it must be
assumed that the legislature acted with wisdom and propriety in
passing the legislation." 71 The Court held that a citizen holds his
property subject to the proper exercise of police power by the
General Assembly directly, or by municipal corporations or
other agencies to which such power has been delegated. Such
laws do not appropriate private property as the plaintiff contended in respect to his well but merely regulate its use and enjoyment by the owner. To effect the purpose of the act, it was
necessary that all citizens, including Craft, connect with the
water system. Craft contended that water rates were taxes within the meaning of Section 170 of the Virginia Constitutionm as
being taxes or assessments upon abutting property owners for
local improvements. The Court held that such rates were neither
taxes nor assessments and were therefore valid. "Creation of sanitary districts and the provisions promulgated by such bodies in
the exercise of police power to regulate and protect the public
health is not a denial of due process or equal protection of the
laws, is not the taking of property without compensation, and
m
notice of adoption is not required." 7
The Court therefore reversed the finding of the trial court,
which had been for Craft, and found in favor of the Sanitation
Commission. "Unless state regulatory legislation is arbitrary,
discriminatory or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and, hence, an unnecessary and unwarTOSubsection 13, Section 6, Acts of Assembly, 1948, and Resolution, June 6,
1950.

v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S.E. 919 (1926).
r2 Hampton Roads Sanitary District Commission v. Smith, 93 Va. 371, 68

71 Gorieb

SJE.2d 497 (1893).
78 Hutchison v. City of Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303, 57 LEd. 520, 37 S.Ct. 250
(1912). And see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 US. 623, 316 LEd. 205, 8 S.Ct.
273 (1887).

ranted interference with individual liberty, courts have refused to
invalidate them as violative of due process." 74
Miscegenation. An unusual case in relation to judicial history
was presented in* Naim v. Naim,75 dealing with miscegenation
statutes and the police power of the state to control marriage.
A suit was instituted by a white woman to annul her marriage
to a Chinaman under the provisions of Section 20-54.76 Section
20-54 states that it shall be unlawful for a white woman to marry
any save a white person. The Circuit Court of Portsmouth rendered a decree declaring the marriage void. This was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia." The United States
Supreme Court 78 ordered that the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Appeals be vacated and the cause remanded thereto for
return to the Circuit Court for action consistent with the United
States Supreme Court's opinion. The Supreme Court of Appeals, 79 per curiam, held their own decree was final and that they
had no power to return the cause to the Circuit Court with directions to reopen the case, gather additional evidence, and render
a new decision. Upon motion to recall the mandate and set the case
down for oral argument, the United States Supreme Court in a
memorandum decision" held that the decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia in response to their order of November 14, 195S, left the case devoid of a properly presented
Federal question.
There is nothing novel about the proposition that the state
may regulate marriage.8 1 Over half of the states of the union
have miscegenation statutes and they have been repeatedly upheld 82 by both the state and federal courts. The importance of
this case rests in its political nature.
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Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, (1951); Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel West-

ern Reference and Board Association, Inc., 313 US. 236 (1940).
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197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
Va. Code (1950).

77 June 13, 1955.

78 350 U.S. 891 (Nov. 14, 1955).
7 90 S.E.2d 849 (Jan. 18, 1956).
80 350 U.S. 893 (March 12, 1956).
81 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1887). And see Kinney v. Comm, 30
Grat. (Va.) 858 (1878).
82 Wood v. Comm., 159 Va. 963, 166 S.E. 477, 85 A.L.R. 121 (1932). And
see Toler v. Oakwood, etc., Corp., 173 Va. 425, 4 S.E.2d 364, 127
A.L.R. 430 (1939); 36 Am. Jur., Miscegenation, S3, p. 452.

In 1816, the United States Supreme Court was faced with
one of the questions posed by the Naim case. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,88 the United States Supreme Court decided that
where a Federal decision and a State decision come in conflict,
the State decision must give way to the supremacy of the Federal
determination. The Hunter'sLessee case was also a Virginia decision. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had to obey the
mandate of the .United States Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia in refusing on January 18,, 1956, to
obey the mandate of the United States Supreme Court of November 14, 1955, on the grounds of procedural inability to comply with the mandate and the subsequent vacillatory action by
the United States Supreme Court on March 12, 1956, in refusing
either to set the case down for oral argument or to reissue the
mandate and allowing the Virginia decision to stand, have reopened the doors closed by the Hunter's Lessee decision. For
140 years judges and lawyers alike had taken it for granted that
the United States Supreme Court's decisions in matters where a
federal question is involved is the supreme law of the land. This
was a basic rock on which the Constitution stood. This decision
of the United States Supreme Court may operate as an opening
wedge for the individual states to renew with increased fervor
the dying but not quite dead idea that the Federal government
should be inferior to the state governments.
Another aspect of the decision in the Naim case which is of
importance is the fact that this is the first recorded case decided in
Virginia which seeks to extend the provisions of Section 20-54
beyond the limits of marriages contracted between white and
colored persons so as to include Asiatics. In light of the recent
trend of cases and decisions handed down by the United States
Supreme Court in the field of education 4 and interstate commerceas as regards integration, it would appear that Virginia is of
the opinion that the best defense is a good offense in combating
federal encroachment on what are considered "state preserves."
The interpretation put on Section 20-54 by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia in the present case would seem to
83 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816).
8
4 See Note 62 supra. And see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 693
(1955).
85Fleming v. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co., 224 F.2d 452 (1955).
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render this section repugnant to Section 52, Constitution of Virginia, 1902, as amended, and therefore void. Section 5286 states:
"No law shall embrace more than one object which shall be expressed in its title; nor shall any law be revised or amended with
reference to its tide; but the act revised or the section amended
shall be re-enacted and published at length. That where an act
embraces two objects, the whole act must be declared void. The
title of an act must not be made a cover for surreptitious or incongruous legislation, nor be such as to mislead the legislature or
the people but should fairly state the general subject covered by
the body of the act." "I
Section 54 is part of Chapter 4, Title 20, Code of Virginia
(1950) and is one section of ten included in Chapter 4. The tide
of Chapter 4 is: COLORED PERSONS; MARRIAGE BETWEEN WHITE AND COLORED PERSONS. The sub-title
of Section 54 is: Intermarriage Prohibited; meaning of term
"4wbitepersons". There is only the remotest possibility that a
court could decide these titles are ambiguous. Lacking such
ambiguity, it is plain that the legislature intended to prohibit intermarriage of white and colored persons. "The title to an act
sets its bounds and to the extent that its provisions exceed those
bounds they are void." 88 To the extent the body of Section 54
purports to extend such prohibition of marriage beyond the limits
of colored and white persons so as to include Asiatics, Mongolians, Malayans, or any other racial group, it comes in conflict
with the title of the act and renders the act void.
Norman A. Crandell
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Constitution of Virginia, 1902, as amended.
7 Comm. v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 11 S.E.2d 120 (1940).
8SWoodihg v. Leigh, 163 Va. 785, 177 SE. 310 (1934). And see Irvine v.
Comm, 124 Va. 817, 97 SE. 769 (1919) where the title of an act being
restrictive in nature (as in the instant case), it was held, with respect to
enumerated matter expressed in the title and unenumerated matter included in the body of the act, that inclusio unis est exclusio alterius
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